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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—Giving Gun Rights Back to the Wrong People:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Takes a Bite Out of The Federal Firearm Prohibition in Wyoming;
United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008).
$AVID 3HIELDS

INTRODUCTION
Due to the use of outdated thinking, individuals who commit crimes of
domestic violence rarely face felony prosecution.1 Seldom do domestic offenders
incur prosecution at all; those who do will, at most, face misdemeanor charges.2
This unfortunate result often stems from a plea agreement.3 Ironically, one-third of
these crimes would qualify as felonies if committed by a stranger.4 In comparison
to similar forms of criminal behavior, domestic violence rarely receives equivalent
prosecutionary treatment.5
On March 27, 2003, the Fremont County Sheriffs’ Department issued Steven
Hays a misdemeanor citation for violating Wyoming’s simple assault and battery
statute.6 Neither the citation issued to Hays, nor the subsequent judgment entered
in the case, described the factual circumstances leading to his conviction.7 On
September 22, 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Hays for possessing a ﬁrearm in
violation of a federal statute prohibiting individuals convicted of a misdemeanor

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank my family and
friends for their support during this project. Special thanks to Professor Lisa Rich for her assistance
with this note. Additionally, I would like to express my immeasurable gratitude to John Barksdale.
Without you, this project would not have been possible; your assistance and words of encouragement
will be missed.
1
United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008); see Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 207846, Family Violence Statistics Including Statistics on Strangers and
Acquaintances 51 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fvs.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009).
2

Hays, 526 F.3d at 680.

3

)D; Adam W. Kersey, -ISDEMEANANTS &IREARMS AND $ISCRETION 4HE 0RACTICAL )MPACT OF 4HE
$EBATE OVER h0HYSICAL &ORCEv AND  53# e '  , 49 WM. MARY L. REV. 1901, 1902 (2008).
4

Hays, 526 F.3d at 680.

5

)D

)D. at 675; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(b) (2008) (“A person is guilty of battery if he
unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”).
6

7

Hays, 526 F.3d at 675.
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crime of domestic violence from possessing or transporting ﬁrearms.8 The grand
jury also indicted Hays under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which provides a sentencing
court with statutory guidance for potential ﬁnes and imprisonment of individuals
found in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).9
Hays’ prior conviction under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) served as the
predicate offense in the federal matter.10 Hays subsequently ﬁled a Motion to
Dismiss the indictment on January 22, 2007, contending his misdemeanor
conviction did not meet the requirements of a crime of domestic violence under
federal law.11 Hays argued his prior Wyoming conviction did not contain an
element of “the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon.”12
In considering Hays’ motion, Judge Clarence Brimmer of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming concluded a person could not make
contact in a “rude, insolent or angry manner” without some level of physical force;
thus, the language of the Wyoming battery statute satisﬁed the requirement for
an element of physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).13 Accordingly,
Judge Brimmer denied the motion and Hays pled guilty, reserving his right to
appeal.14 Judge Brimmer sentenced Hays to eighteen months in prison and three
years of supervised release.15
On appeal, Hays again argued that his prior conviction under Wyoming
Statute § 6-2-501(b) did not satisfy the use of physical force element required by
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic

8

)D.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (West 2005).
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any ﬁrearm or
ammunition; or to receive any ﬁrearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
9

Hays, 526 F.3d at 675; 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)
(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be ﬁned as provided in this title, imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.”).
10

Hays, 526 F.3d at 675.

11

)D.; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (West 2006) (deﬁning a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence as an offense that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon”).
12

Hays, 526 F.3d at 675.

13

)D at 676.

14

)D at 675–76.

15

)D. at 675 (Hays appealed this decision on May 2, 2008).
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violence.16 In essence, Hays claimed the federal statute required more than the de
minimis contact criminalized by Wyoming’s simple assault and battery statute.17
The United States Attorney’s ofﬁce, argued to the contrary, following the
reasoning of the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.18 It contended Hays’
domestic violence conviction under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) satisﬁed 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s requirement for the use of “physical force” against
the victim.19 The United States Attorney asserted the improbability of physically
touching someone in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner” without also exerting
some degree of physical force against that person.20 The United States Attorney
concluded Wyoming’s statute met the deﬁnitional requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and therefore, a conviction under this statute constituted a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.21 Such a conviction forbids offenders
from possessing ﬁrearms.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with
Hays and held that Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) does not satisfy the “use or
attempted use of physical force” element of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).23 In
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the reasoning of the First, Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits.24 The Tenth Circuit reasoned those courts may be correct
from a scientiﬁc perspective, but such a holding merges violent and non-violent
offenses into one category.25 The Tenth Circuit held Wyoming’s simple assault
and battery statute does not satisfy the requirement for an element of physical
force.26
This case note addresses the varying approaches federal courts utilize in
determining whether statutes similar to Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501 satisfy the
federal deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.27 This note also
16
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 6, United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, No. 07-8039 (10th
Cir. Jul. 20, 2007).
17

)D

18

See infra notes 44–55 and accompanying text (discussing if the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous courts are bound to follow it as long as the results are neither unreasonable, nor
absurd).
19

Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 28, United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, No. 07-8039 (10th
Cir. Aug. 20, 2007).
20

)D

21

)D

22

)D

23

Hays, 526 F.3d at 680–81.

24

)D. at 681.

25

)D

26

)D.

27

See infra notes 39–87 and accompanying text.
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examines the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in
United States v. Hays.28 Finally, this case note illustrates the need for the United
States Supreme Court to resolve the split of authority and provide a uniform
interpretation of the behavior criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).29

BACKGROUND
Given the Hays court’s focus regarding whether Wyoming’s battery statute
satisﬁed the federal deﬁnition of a crime of domestic violence, this section ﬁrst
discusses why Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting
18 U.S.C § 922(g)(9).30 This section also explains the federal circuits’ varying
interpretations of whether the federal deﬁnition of a crime of domestic violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) criminalizes de minimis touches.31
The Lautenberg Amendment
In 1996, Congress codiﬁed a ﬁrearm restriction for qualiﬁed domestic
offenders, which prohibits criminals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence from possessing a ﬁrearm.32 By enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(9), Congress aimed to close a “dangerous loophole” allowing violent offenders
to possess ﬁrearms.33 The amendment, known as the “Lautenberg Amendment,”
relies on the prosecution of criminals under state substantive law.34 This state
conviction dependence gives states a signiﬁcant role in the facilitation of federal
criminal “policy and goals.”35 Some commentators claim the use of state criminal
proceedings as predicate offenses to federal ﬁrearm convictions not only has
the potential to lead to an arbitrary application of the law, but also relinquishes
federal lawmaking authority to the states.36 These commentators contend federal
28

See infra notes 88–124 and accompanying text.

29

See infra notes 125–200 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.

31

See infra notes 39–87 and accompanying text.

32

Matthew A. Radefeld, #OMMENTARY %VER (EARD OF THE ,AUTENBERG !MENDMENT $ONT 7ORRY
9OURE .OT !LONE, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct. 31, 2005.
33

United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009); Hays, 526 F.3d at 679.
During the debate of the bill, that later became 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), one of
the sponsoring senators referred repeatedly to “wife beaters” and “child abusers”
and also to “people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse” and “people
who show they cannot control themselves and are prone to ﬁts of violent rage,”
suggesting that the concern was with the violent individuals rather than those who
have merely touched their spouse or child in a rude manner.

Hays, 526 F.3d at 679.
34

See Kersey, supra note 3, at 1902; Wayne A. Logan, #REATING A h(YDRA IN 'OVERNMENTv
&EDERAL 2ECOURSE TO 3TATE ,AW IN #RIME &IGHTING, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2006).
35

Logan, supra note 34, at 70, 90–96.

36

)D. at 90–96.
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courts interpreting federal statutes having a foundation in state substantive law
must be cognizant of these two concerns because of the far-reaching effects of
the Amendment.37 Since no exemptions to the Lautenberg Amendment exist,
convicted individuals who use ﬁrearms in their line of work must procure different
forms of employment because they may no longer possess a ﬁrearm.38

)NTERPRETATION OF THE ,AUTENBERG !MENDMENT WITHIN THE &EDERAL #OURTS
Currently, a split of authority exists among the circuit courts of appeals
regarding the issue presented in United States v. Hays. 39 The United States Courts
of Appeals for the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits held the plain language of
the statute should control.40 Under this view, the federal deﬁnition of domestic
violence makes it clear that a person cannot make physical contact with another
without rising to some level of physical force.41 Meanwhile, the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have adopted a standard requiring the violent use of physical force.42

37

)D

38

Radefeld, supra note 32.
Under the Lautenberg Amendment, if a law enforcement ofﬁcer or a member of
the military is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, they cannot
possess a ﬁrearm ever again. Such a conviction may result in loss of employment or
permanent reassignment to a position that does not involve carrying or possessing
a ﬁrearm.

)D
39

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 n.4 (Ebel, J., dissenting), see generally John M. Skakun III, Violence
AND #ONTACT )NTERPRETING h0HYSICAL &ORCEv IN THE ,AUTENBERG !MENDMENT, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1833
(2008) (discussing the split amongst the federal circuits which recognize de minimis touching and
courts which require a violent act to satisfy § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)).
40
See United States v. Grifﬁth, 455 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding under the
plain meaning rule, the “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature” made illegal by
Georgia Statute satisﬁed the “physical force” requirement of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)); United States v.
Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding all convictions under the Maine statute necessarily
involve, as an element, the use of “physical force”); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621
n.2 (8th Cir. 1999) (ﬁnding insulting or offensive contact, by necessity, requires physical force to
complete).
41

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

42

See United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Belless pled guilty to battery
in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) and years later faced prosecution for violating 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). )D. at 1065. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that Wyoming’s battery statute encompassed less violent behavior than deﬁnitional requirements
of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and was too broad to qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence. )D. at 1069. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case. )D at 1070.
See also Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Flores pled guilty in Indiana to battery,
a misdemeanor under Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1, which criminalizes “rude, insolent, or angry”
touching, as does Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b). Id. at 669. The Board of Immigration Appeals
determined this offense qualiﬁed as a crime of domestic violent under 18 U.S.C.S. § 16 and ordered
Flores’ removal from the country. )D. at 671. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit found the issue was whether the offense created under the Indiana Code
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Despite the varying interpretations of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the United States
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari when presented with this issue.43

4HE 0LAIN ,ANGUAGE OF THE 3TATUTE 3HOULD #ONTROL 4HE &IRST %IGHTH AND
%LEVENTH #IRCUITS
The First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals applied the
principles of statutory construction in their interpretation.44 When faced with
determining whether statutes similar to Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) satisﬁed
the “use of physical force” element, as required in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s deﬁnition
of a crime of domestic violence, the First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits concluded
the language of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is clear and unambiguous.45 Courts must follow
the language of the statute as long as the plain meaning is neither unreasonable
nor absurd.46 The First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have
concluded the application of the plain meaning of the term “physical force” in
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) produced neither unreasonable nor absurd results.47 All three
circuits acknowledge the impossibility for an offender to touch an individual in
an offensive manner without exerting some level of physical force, thus holding
that de minimis touches satisfy the physical force requirement.48
The First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits referenced 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) to
further support the position.49 Subsection 922(g)(8) contains a qualifying clause,
which limits its reach to a speciﬁc subset of physical force: the type reasonably
expected to cause physical injury.50 In United States v. Nason and United States v.
qualiﬁed as a removable offense. )D. at 669. Despite a police report showing that Flores attacked
and beat his wife, the court found the elements of Flores’ battery conviction could not properly be
viewed as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.S. § 16. )D. at 672. Therefore, the court vacated the
order for Flores’ removal from the country. )D
43

See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000); Brady v. United States, 513
U.S. 894 (1994).
44
Nason, 269 F.3d at 16 (“Where statutory interpretation is in prospect, the jumping off
point always is the text of the statute itself.”); 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1342 (“In interpreting a statute
we look ﬁrst to the plain meaning of its words.”) (quoting United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 113,
1121 (11th Cir. 2001)).
45

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16 (“This venerable reference work deﬁnes physical force as force
consisting in a physical act. The word force means power, violence, or pressure directed against a
person or thing.” (internal quotations omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (7th ed. 1999).
46

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16.

47

)D.; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1342; Smith, 171 F.3d at 621.

48

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1344–45; Smith, 171 F.3d at 621.

49

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16; "ELLESS, 338 F.3d at 1063–64.

50

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2008) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, who is subject to a court order that was issued
after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such
person had an opportunity to participate; restrains such person from harassing,
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'RIFlTH, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Eleventh Circuits
respectively, found Congress revealed its intent by restricting the scope of § 922(g)
(8) with a modifying clause, but declined to do so in § 922(g)(9).51
Additionally, in United States v. Nason, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit found the legislative history suggested Congress did not
intend to include an injury requirement.52 While on the Senate ﬂoor, Senator
Frank Lautenberg observed under the ﬁnal amendment that the ban applies to
crimes that have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon.53 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit found Senator Lautenberg’s comments helpful when construing
the federal statute.54 The court concluded Senator Lautenberg’s comments
demonstrated the principal purpose of substituting “crimes involving the use or
attempted use of physical force” for “crimes of violence” in § 922(g)(9) was to
enlarge the scope of predicate offenses covered by the statute.55

4HE %LEMENT OF 0HYSICAL &ORCE -UST "E 6IOLENT 4HE 3EVENTH AND .INTH
Circuits
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have interpreted “the use or attempted use of physical force” element in § 921(a)
(33)(A)(ii) differently.56 When examining broad state assault and battery statutes,
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have asserted de minimis touches cannot be
categorized as violent based on the deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
stalking or threatening an intimate partner . . . in reasonable fear of bodily injury
to the partner or child; and includes a ﬁnding that such person represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or by its
terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to
CAUSE BODILY INJURY.
)D (emphasis added).
51

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16–17 (“After all, when Congress inserts limiting language in one section
of a statute but abjures that language in another, closely related section, the usual presumption is
that Congress acted deliberately and purposefully in the disparate omission.”); see Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (“It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); 'RIFlTH,
455 F.3d at 1342 (“If Congress had wanted to limit the physical force requirement in § 922(g)(9),
it could have done so, as it did in the last clause of the preceding paragraph of the same subsection
. . . but that is not what Congress did. That it did not speaks loudly and clearly.”).
52

Nason, 269 F.3d at 17–18.

53

142 CONG. REC. S11,877 (1996).

54

Nason, 269 F.3d at 17.

55

)D

56

See generally Flores, 350 F.3d at 668–69; United States v. Norbinga, 474 F.3d 561, 563–64
(9th Cir. 2006).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 2, Art. 8

606

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

violence.57 These courts reasoned that a strict interpretation in cases involving de
minimis touching leads to harsh results.58 The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals assert that in order to avoid collapsing the distinction between violent
and non-violent offenses, the word “force” requires a different legal meaning in
contrast to its general scientiﬁc meaning.59
In order to preserve the distinction between violent and non-violent offenses,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Flores, established a
standard requiring force of a violent nature.60 This standard criminalizes force
meant to cause, or likely to cause, bodily injury.61 The court conceded establishing
such a benchmark for the use of “physical force” set a qualitative, rather than
quantitative, line.62 However, the court elaborated that without creating a
minimum boundary for the use of force, the distinction between the use of
“physical force against” and “physical contact” would be indistinguishable, despite
having different legal meanings.63
Establishing a standard requiring the use, or attempted use, of violent physical
force is signiﬁcant when examining a broad battery statute like Wyoming Statute

57

See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of de minimis
touches when considering the “physical force” requirement in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)).
58

Flores, 350 F.3d at 671–72.
Every battery entails a touch, and it is impossible to touch someone without
applying some force, if only a smidgeon. . . . Every battery involves “force” in
the sense of physics or engineering, where “force” means the acceleration of mass.
A dyne is the amount of force needed to accelerate one gram of mass by one
centimeter per second per second. . . . Perhaps one could read the word “force”
in § 16(a) to mean one dyne or more, but that would make hash of the effort to
distinguish ordinary crimes from violent ones.

)D
59
)D at 672 (“[W]e must treat the word force as having a meaning in the legal community
that differs from its meaning in the physics community.”); "ELLESS, 338 F.3d at 1068 (stating the use
of deadly weapon as discussed in the federal deﬁnition is a gravely serious threat in comparison with
the ungentlemanly conduct criminalized by the Wyoming statute).
60

Flores, 350 F.3d at 672; see Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 875 n.10 (7th Cir.
2000); Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 604–05 (7th Cir. 1999).
61

Flores, 350 F.3d at 672.
Otherwise, “physical force against” and “physical contact with” would end up
meaning the same thing, even though these senses are distinct in law. This is
not a quantitative line (“how many newtons makes a touching violent?”) but a
qualitative one. An offensive touching is on the “contact” side of this line, a punch
on the “force” side; and even though we know that Flores’s acts were on the “force”
side of this legal line, the elements of his offense are on the “contact” side.

)D
62

)D

63

)D.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss2/8
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§ 6-2-501(b) because of the criminalization of de minimis touching.64 In Flores,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit analyzed a broad
Indiana battery statute incorporating “rude, insolent, or angry” language similar
to the Wyoming statute.65 The court found the elements of petitioner’s battery
conviction could not properly be viewed as a “crime of violence” given the broad
range of conduct criminalized by the Indiana statute.66

5NITED 3TATES V "ELLESS
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 5NITED 3TATES V "ELLESS is
signiﬁcant because the court interprets the same Wyoming statute at issue
in Hays.67 In "ELLESS, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed whether Wyoming’s battery statute satisﬁes the “use of physical force”
element required by the § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence.68 The "ELLESS court, using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
concluded Wyoming’s battery statute does not embrace conduct rising to the
level of the federal deﬁnition’s requirement for “physical force.” 69 Speciﬁcally, the
court held the prong of the statute criminalizing rude, insolent, or angry touches
failed to meet the element of “physical force” required by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).70
The court found § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) required the violent use of force against the
body. 71 The court reasoned that Wyoming’s legislature drafted the more inclusive
battery statute to criminalize behavior that often leads to serious violence.72 The
court presumed it may be the state’s objective to allow police to arrest individuals
for de minimis touches and therefore ensure such acts would not escalate into
violence.73 In light of this standard, the "ELLESS court held Wyoming Statute § 6-2501(b) does not satisfy the § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) deﬁnition of a crime of domestic
violence.74
64

See id. at 666.

)D at 668; IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a) (2008) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally
touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B
misdemeanor.”).
65

66

Flores, 350 F.3d at 672 (pleading guilty in the United States District Court for the District
of Montana to illegally possessing a ﬁrearm in violation of § 922(g)(9)).
67

"ELLESS, 338 F.3d at 1065. While Belless’ prosecution took place in the Ninth Circuit, the
predicate offense in this matter was a violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b). )D
68

)D

69

)D. at 1067–68. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis provides that “the meaning of doubtful
words may be determined by reference to associated words and phrases.” )D. at 1068.
70

)D.

71

)D.

72

"ELLESS, 338 F.3d at 1068 (enabling police to arrest and intervene in such confrontations in
order and avoid the risk that rude touchings will escalate into further violence).
73

)D.

74

)D at 1069.
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3PLIT OF !UTHORITY WITHIN THE 5NITED 3TATES $ISTRICT #OURTS OF 7YOMING
Prior to Hays, a split of authority existed within the United States District
Courts for the District of Wyoming as to whether 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)
includes de minimis touching.75 The Chief Judge for the District of Wyoming,
William F. Downes, examined the issue in 5NITED 3TATES V 'ONZALES76 As in Hays,
Gonzales allegedly violated Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) and was subsequently
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).77 Judge Downes agreed with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Wyoming Statute
§ 6-2-501(b) in "ELLESS.78 Accordingly, the court held Wyoming’s battery statute,
which criminalizes nonviolent conduct, does not satisfy the element of physical
force in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and dismissed the charge against Mr. Gonzales.79
However, Judge Clarence Brimmer and Judge Alan Johnson, Wyoming’s other
two United States District Court Judges, sided with the reasoning of the First,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals on the issue presented in Hays.80
In 5NITED 3TATES V -C#UE, Judge Brimmer held the language of Wyoming Statute
§ 6-2-501(b) was not overinclusive and criminalized conduct sufﬁcient to meet the
element of “physical force” in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).81 Similarly, in United States v.
2AEL, Judge Johnson found the position of the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals better aligned with the principles of statutory interpretation
and legislative intent.82 By favorably citing 'RIFlTH and Nason, Judge Johnson
held Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) met the physical force requirement of
§ 922(a)(33)(A)(ii).83 In essence, the court effectively rejected "ELLESS’ interpretation
75

See infra notes 76–87 and accompanying text.

76

5NITED 3TATES V 'ONZALES, 05-CR0276-D, Order Granting Mot. Dismiss Count Three
(Mar. 29, 2006).
77

)D.

78

)D

79

)D

80

See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.

81

5NITED 3TATES V -C#UE, No. 05-CR-222, Order Denying Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Count Two of
the Indictment (Nov. 17, 2006) (“Therefore, under the plain meaning rule, ‘the unlawful touching
of another in a rude, insolent or angry manner’ made illegal by the Wyoming battery statute satisﬁes
the ‘physical force’ requirement of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).”).
82

5NITED 3TATES V 2AEL, No. 06-CR-183 Order Denying Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Count One
and Two of the Indictment (Nov. 27, 2006).
83

)D at 6.
This Court’s decision that Wyoming’s battery statute is sufﬁcient to qualify as a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(a)(33)(A) is supported by
the plain meaning of the statute. This court takes particular note of the fact that
§ 921(a)(33)(A) does not specify any particular degree of physical force required
before an act may be considered a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
Instead, the statute plainly refers only to the use or attempted use of physical force.

)D
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of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b).84 The court, just as in Nason and 'RIFlTH,
declined to read § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) as requiring physical force be violent, when
Congress itself declined to include modifying language.85
The district courts for the District of Wyoming, like the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals, were split as to whether the deﬁnitional requirements of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) for the use or attempted use of physical force are met by de
minimis touches.86 However, in Hays, the Tenth Circuit interpreted § 921(a)(33)
(A)(ii)’s physical force requirement differently than any other court to previously
rule on the issue.87

PRINCIPAL CASE
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit narrowly
decided Hays by a two-to-one vote with Circuit Judge Seymour authoring the
opinion for the majority.88 The court adhered to precedent in cases where a
defendant contests whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence and applied
the categorical approach.89 The categorical approach does not involve a factual
inquiry, but rather an examination of the statute under which a defendant was
charged, and an examination of that prong on its face.90 The categorical approach
permits a court to look beyond the statute to the facts of the prior conviction only
in certain circumstances.91

-AJORITY /PINION
The court began its analysis by examining the text of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(9) and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).92 Because Hays’ appeal turned on the
84

)D. at 7.

85

)D.

86

See supra notes 44–87 and accompanying text.

87

See infra notes 93–107 and accompanying text.

88

See generally Hays, 526 F.3d at 674.

89

)D. at 676; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (ﬁnding persuasive
authority in the holdings of the Courts of Appeals which mandate a formal categorical approach
looking only to the statutory deﬁnitions of the prior offenses, not to the particular facts of those
underlying convictions).
90
Hays, 526 F.3d at 676 (“Such review does not involve a subjective inquiry into the facts of
the case, but rather its purpose is to determine ‘which part of the statute was charged against the
defendant and, thus, which portion of the statute to examine on its face.’”).
91

)D (“When the underlying statute reaches a broad range of conduct, some of which merits
an enhancement and some of which does not, courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting
reliable judicial records, such as the charging document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.”).
92

)D. at 676; see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004); United States v. SanchezGarcia, 501 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2007); McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 498 (10th Cir.
2006).
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interpretation of the term “physical force,” and the fact that neither 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9) nor § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) provided a deﬁnition for the term, the court
turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for guidance.93 The court found the deﬁnitions
implied the term “physical force” requires something more than mere contact.94
The court contended its interpretation—that physical force entailed something
more than de minimis touches—conformed to what the United States Supreme
Court and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had suggested.95 With this notion
of “physical force” in mind, the court noted the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “crime of violence” in Leocal v. Ashcroft, as well as the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation in Flores v. Ashcroft, to support its holding that “physical
force” requires violence.96 Additionally, the court examined the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of “physical force” in 5NITED 3TATES V "ELLESS, as
well as its own interpretation in 5NITED 3TATES V 3ANCHEZ 'ARCIA97
The court observed the record did not indicate whether Hays had violated
the “unlawfully touching” prong or the “recklessly causes bodily injury prong”
of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b).98 According to the court, without any
information regarding Hays’ underlying conviction, both prongs of the Wyoming
battery statute must satisfy the federal deﬁnition of a crime of domestic violence.99
Under the modiﬁed categorical approach, the court concluded each prong must
satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s deﬁnition, or Hays’ prior conviction under
the Wyoming Statute could not support the charge in his federal indictment.100

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th Abridged ed. 2005) (deﬁning “force” as “power, violence,
or pressure directed against a person or thing,” and the term “physical force” as “force consisting in
a physical act, esp. a violent act directed against a robbery victim”).
93

94

Hays, 526 F.3d at 677.

95

)D. (“Consistent with these deﬁnitions, the Supreme Court and both this circuit and others
have suggested that physical force means more than mere physical contact; that some degree of
power or violence must be present in that contact to constitute physical force.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
96

)D; Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 (“The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s
emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force
in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent active crimes that cannot be said naturally to
include DUI offenses.”); Flores, 350 F.3d at 672 (“Perhaps one could read the word ‘force’ in § 16(a)
to mean one dyne or more, but that would make hash of the effort to distinguish ordinary crimes
from violent ones.”).
97

Hays, 526 F.3d at 678 (“‘[F]orce’ refers to ‘destructive or violent force.’” (quoting United
States v. Venegas-Ornelas, 348 F.3d 1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003))).
98

)D. Due to the restrictions of the modiﬁed categorical approach, the only document in the
record containing any information about the circumstances of Hays’ underlying conviction was the
pre-sentence report; a document the court could not examine to resolve ambiguity. )D
99

)D

100

)D.
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In analyzing the ﬁrst prong of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) forbidding
“rude, insolent, or angry” touching, the court discerned the Wyoming statute
incorporates the common law rule and any touching, however slight, constitutes
battery.101 However, the court reasoned the common law rule has become
antiquated, as many states have moved away from the broad deﬁnition due to
the Model Penal Code’s inﬂuence on state substantive law.102 Accordingly, the
court found the ﬁrst prong of Wyoming’s assault and battery statute criminalized
conduct which did not satisfy the deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).103
The court next examined the Congressional Record and the legislative history
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).104 The court found that during the debate of what
later became 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), Senator Lautenburg repeatedly referred
to individuals such as “wife beaters” and “child abusers,” suggesting Congress’
concern was violent offenders, rather than those who have merely touched another
in a rude manner.105 The court determined Congress broadened the scope of the
ﬁrearm prohibition to include individuals employing violent force in non-felony
crimes.106

$ISSENTING /PINION
Judge Ebel wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the court’s holding was not
supported by the principles of statutory construction or wise public policy.107
Judge Ebel, unlike the majority, agreed with the reasoning of the United States

101

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §16.2 (2d ed. 2007).

Hays, 526 F.3d at 679 n.2; see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102(1)(c) (West 1953)
(criminalizing behavior which intends or actually causes bodily injury); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18-3-202 to -204 (West. 2004) (criminalizing behavior in which the offender must intend to
injure or actually cause bodily harm to the body of another, or act with an extreme indifference to
the value of human life).
102

103

Hays, 526 F.3d at 679 (“Indeed, one can think of any number of ‘touchings’ that might be
considered ‘rude’ or ‘insolent’ in a domestic setting but would not rise to the level of physical force
discussed [in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)].”).
104

)D

105

)D

106

)D. at 680.
These comments make clear that Congress broadened the scope of § 922(g) to
encompass misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence not out of a hope to keep
guns out of the hands of individuals who may have inﬂicted de minimis touches
on their spouses or children, but to keep guns out of the hands of domestic abusers
who previously fell outside the bounds of the statute because they were convicted
of misdemeanors rather than felonies due to “outdated thinking” or plea-bargains.

)D
107

)D. at 682 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, and found the
language of the statute clear and unambiguous, therefore, the plain meaning
should control.108 Judge Ebel concluded Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) does
not criminalize incidental contact, but rather deliberate touches.109 From his
perspective, these types of intentional touches constitute the kind of aggression
Congress meant to include in the enactment of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).110
Judge Ebel criticized the majority’s heavy reliance on United States v. Leocal.111
In his opinion, Leocal was not on point because the Florida statute did not include
a mens rea requirement, while Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) clearly incorporates
a mens rea requirement.112
In addition, Judge Ebel argued the court’s reasoning was misguided based
on the language of the statutory scheme.113 In Judge Ebel’s opinion, the statutory
language of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is clear and unambiguous, therefore, the court
did not need to judicially graft qualifying language onto § 922(g)(9).114 Judge
Ebel asserted an examination of § 922(g)(8)(C) demonstrated Congress had the
capacity to add modifying language to § 922(g)(9).115 Such a ﬁnding made it clear
that Congress purposely left the qualifying language broad enough to incorporate
all types of force, including de minimis touches.116

108

Hays, 526 F.3d at 682 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

109

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

110

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

111

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting); see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7. From a scientiﬁc perspective, every touch
does include some level of physical force, but something more is required from a legal standpoint.
)D
112

Hays, 526 F.3d at 682–83 (Ebel, J., dissenting); see Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 924
(Wyo. 1994).
[I]t is clear that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-501 and 6-5-502, . . . simple assault and
battery and aggravated assault and battery, are the statutory equivalents of a crime
at common law. As such, the court had no hesitancy in concluding that Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) is a general intent crime and would no doubt reach
the same conclusion in relation to § 6-2-501. Importantly, general intent crimes
require the intentional doing of the prohibited act. Thus, an individual may not
violate Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501 by engaging in the type of negligent or merely
accidental conduct.
)D. (internal citation omitted).
113

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

114

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting); see $UNCAN, 533 U.S. at 173 (2001).

115

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

116

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, the actual language of the standard troubled Judge Ebel.117
Judge Ebel argued the majority’s reliance on United States v. Leocal and United
States v. Flores led it to require that “physical force result in some sort of harm
or injury.”118 According to Judge Ebel, imposing a standard requiring the use
of physical force result in either harm or injury provides little clarity as to what
qualiﬁes under the federal deﬁnition of a crime of domestic violence.119 Judge
Ebel asserted, “[o]nce we start down the slippery slope left open by the majority
opinion of qualifying what constitutes ‘physical force,’ our work will never be
done.”120
In Judge Ebel’s opinion, the court’s adoption of the physical force standard
was neither necessary nor helpful.121 Judge Ebel proffered the court’s opinion was
not supported by the plain language of the statute, the overall statutory scheme in
which § 922(g)(9) is included, or by wise public policy.122 Judge Ebel concluded
Congress adopted the more applicable standard based on its’ own appreciation
for the difﬁculties of deﬁning qualifying conduct.123 Like the First, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, Judge Ebel would have held the plain
language of the statute should control.124

ANALYSIS
The reasoning of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Hays is problematic for several reasons.125 First, the court erred by
concluding the 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) physical force requirement entails
something more than de minimis touching.126 Second, the court ignored its own
previous interpretation of the term “physical force.”127 Third, the court incorrectly
imposed a legal standard requiring the use of physical force result in physical
harm or injury.128 Fourth, rather than seizing the opportunity to clarify whether
117
)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting) (“It imposes an amorphous legal standard to determine whether
conduct involving ‘physical force’ rises to the level of a predicate offense for purposes of section
922(g)(9).”).
118

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting).

119

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting).

120

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the problematic effect of a
standard requiring the use or attempted use of physical force result in either harm or injury because
there is no bright line rule for quantifying “physical force”).
121

)D at 685 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

122

)D at 682 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

123

)D at 685 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

124

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

125

See infra notes 131–97 and accompanying text.

126

See infra notes 131–62 and accompanying text.

127

See infra notes 163–74 and accompanying text.

128

See infra notes 175–86 and accompanying text.
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Wyoming’s battery statute satisﬁes the use of physical force requirement of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the court further complicated the law.129 Additionally, this
section discusses the Hays decision’s practical implications on the ﬁrearm rights
of individuals convicted under broad state assault and battery statutes within the
Tenth Circuit.130

4HE 0LAIN ,ANGUAGE OF e A  ! II IS #LEAR AND 5NAMBIGUOUS
The holdings of the First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are more consistent
with the principles of statutory interpretation and legislative intent compared
to the other circuits.131 The ﬁrst step in any statutory exercise is to examine the
language of the statute itself.132 If the statutory language has a plain meaning,
the courts are bound to follow that language.133 The term “physical force” is an
elementary concept, readily understood within the legal community.134 Given the
clarity of “physical force,” the plain meaning of the language must control.135
Furthermore, Congress is entitled to deﬁne the terms governing crimes freely.136
For a court to ﬁnd ambiguity from a straightforward phrase such as “physical
force” on the basis that it disagrees with Congress’ effort is improper.137 Supposing
Congress’ deﬁnition of a qualifying misdemeanor does not encompass all types of
force when the language clearly supports the proposition is unfounded.138
The faulty reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, on
which the Tenth Circuit relied, frustrates the congressional intent behind § 922(g)
(9).139 The Hays court’s reliance on Leocal, Flores, and "ELLESS leads to a misguided
interpretation of “physical force.”140 As Judge Ebel points out in the dissent, the

129

See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.

130

See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.

131

5NITED 3TATES V 2AEL, No. 06-CR0183, Order Denying Def. Mot. to Dismiss Count One
and Two of the Indictment (Nov. 27, 2006) (ﬁnding the statutory language of Wyoming Statute
§ 6-2-501(b) has a plain meaning and without ambiguity, a court must follow that language).
132

Hays, 526 F.3d at 677; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1342; Nason, 269 F.3d at 15–16.

133

See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57–58, (1997); United States v. Charles George
Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987); -C'RAW, 450 F.3d at 498.
134

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1345 (“Unlike the Seventh Circuit, we do
not feel compelled to reach a result at war with common sense, particularly when doing so would
require us to alter the plain language of what Congress has written.”).
135

Nason, 269 F.3d at 16.

136

)D at 17.

137

)D

138

)D

139

Hays, 526 F.3d at 685 (Ebel, J., dissenting); see Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1081 (construing
§ 922(g)(9) to exclude the domestic abuser convicted under a generic use-of-force statute would
frustrate Congress’ purpose).
140

Hays, at 682–84 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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court’s reliance on Leocal is misplaced.141 The court shows a broad deference to the
United States Supreme Court’s statement in Leocal that it could not “forget that it
was ultimately . . . determining the meaning of the phrase ‘crime of violence.’”142
However, rather than determining the meaning of the phrase “crime of violence,”
the Hays court was asked to decipher the meaning of the term “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence.”143 As Judge Ebel noted, the court gave no weight to
the misdemeanor qualiﬁer.144 By its very nature, a misdemeanor crime will involve
less violence than a felony.145
Likewise, the court’s dependence on Flores is mistaken.146 In Flores, the
Seventh Circuit considered 18 U.S.C. § 16, a statute similar to § 921(a)(33)(A)
(ii).147 The court seems to adopt &LORES scientiﬁc discussion of “force” as a clear
indication that Congress did not intend to include de minimis touches in the
deﬁnition of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).148 The Hays court’s approval of this discussion
is problematic because it deviates from the plain language of § 921(a)(33)(A)
(ii).149 The physics discussion in Flores addresses matters wholly unrelated to
the practical application of the law.150 &LORES examination considers hypothetical
situations such as snowballs, spitballs and paper airplanes.151 These situations are
the type where minimal amounts of “dynes” or “newtons” of force are used against
others.152 Rarely would an individual be prosecuted for offenses involving spitballs

141

)D at 682–83 (Ebel, J., dissenting); Leocal, 547 U.S. at 7. In Leocal, the United States
Supreme Court was asked to consider the meaning of the term “crime of violence.” )D However,
the Hays court was being asked to weigh the meaning of the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.” Hays, 526 F.3d at 683.
142
Hays, 526 F.3d at 683 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (“In this regard, the majority asserts that it
is signiﬁcant for our purposes that the Leocal Court went on to assert, ‘the ordinary meaning of
this term, combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against another person . . .
suggests a category of violent active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”).
143

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting).

144

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

145

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

146

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting); see infra notes 148–56 and accompanying text.

147

See Flores, 350 F.3d at 668. The Immigration and Nationality Act deﬁned a “crime of
domestic violence” in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 16 as a crime that has, an element, the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. Flores, 350 F.3d at
668; Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 9.
148
Hays, 526 F.3d at 678; see supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text for discussion of
“force” in Flores.
149

'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1345.

150

Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 20; Flores, 350 F.3d at 673 (Evans, J., concurring)
(“We recently observed that critics of our system of law often see it as ‘not tethered very closely to
common sense.’”).
151

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

152

Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 20; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1345.
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and paper airplanes.153 In the real world, a person is prosecuted for actual battery
against the body of another.154 A consideration of time and resources in relation
to the circumstances surrounding battery prosecutions within the American legal
system leads to the rational conclusion that individuals rarely face prosecution for
little more than a minimal exertion of “dynes” or “newtons.”155
The "ELLESS court’s reasoning presents the same analytical problems as Flores.156
Following "ELLESS misguided discussion of Newtonian mechanics, the court stated
its goal in this exercise is to allocate criminal responsibility, not take part in a
discussion of physics.157 This statement is clearly erroneous as the function of
assigning criminal responsibility belongs to Congress.158 A reading of a statute
contradicting the plain meaning ultimately frustrates Congress’ intent for the
broad application of these sections.159 The Hays court found the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit in "ELLESS persuasive and consequently added its own qualifying
language to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).160 As in Hays, imposing a standard
requiring violent physical force when Congress itself did not include such a
requirement is inappropriate.161 If Congress had intended the term “physical

153
Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 20; Flores, 350 at 672 (Evans, J., concurring)
(“For one thing, people don’t get charged criminally for expending a newton of force against
victims.”).
154
Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 20; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1345 (inferring that
prosecutions based on a minimal exertion of force are divorced from common sense and have little
or no basis in the real world).
155
Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19 at 20; Flores, 350 at 672 (Evans, J., concurring);
Skakun, supra note 39, at 1852 (“And as a practical matter, it is likely that actual violence, not mere
touching, is the basis of almost all assault and battery convictions for making physical contact with
a domestic intimate.”).
156

5NITED 3TATES V 2AEL, No. 06-CR-183, Order Denying Def ’s Mot. to Dismiss Count One
and Two of the Indictment (Nov. 27, 2006) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of “physical force”
based on Newtonian mechanics and the associated language requiring “threatened use of a deadly
weapon”).
157
)D.; 'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1344; see U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.2 (granting Congress the power
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution).
158
5NITED 3TATES V 'ONZALES, No. 05-CR-276-D Order Granting Mot. Dismiss Count Three
(Mar. 29, 2006); see also Pioneer Inv. Serv. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (“Courts
properly assume, absent sufﬁcient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends the words in its
enactments to carry ‘their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”).
159

5NITED 3TATES V -C#UE, No. 05-CR-222-B, Order Denying Defendant’s Motions to
Dismiss Count One and Two of the Indictment (Nov. 27, 2006) at 7.
160

See Hays, 526 F.3d at 681 (holding Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(b) does not satisfy the “use
of physical force” element in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) because from a legal standpoint, “physical force”
entails more than mere touching).
161

5NITED 3TATES V -C#UE, No. 05-CR-222-B, Order Denying Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss
Count One and Two of the Indictment (Nov. 27, 2006) at 7; see supra note 51 and accompanying
text (discussing the impropriety of adding language which Congress itself did not include).
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force” to actually mean violent physical force, it could have expressly included the
distinction in the statute’s text.162

Hays’ )NTERPRETATION 3TRAYS &ROM 0RECEDENT
Another problematic aspect of the Hays decision is the court’s disregard for its
own previous interpretation of the term “physical force.”163 It is important to note
that until Hays, the Tenth Circuit had not ruled on the precise issue presented
in Hays.164 However, it previously interpreted analogous statutory language in
5NITED 3TATES V 4RETO -ARTINEZ.165 In 4RETO -ARTINEZ, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether a prior felony conviction under Kansas’ aggravated
battery statute constituted a “crime of violence” for the purposes of U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).166 The U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) deﬁnitional requirements are
similar to those of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) as both include as an element the
“use or attempted use of physical force.”167 The Kansas aggravated battery statute,
like the Wyoming statute, prohibits “intentionally causing physical contact with
another person when done in a rude, insulting, or angry manner with a deadly
weapon.”168 In 4RETO -ARTINEZ, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
intentional touching of another with a deadly weapon in a “rude, insolent, or
angry manner” did involve the use of physical force.169
162
See Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting); Nason, 269 F.3d at 16–18; 'RIFlTH, 455
F.3d at 1342.
163

See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text.

164

Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 9.

165

)D see United States v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Miller, 98 Fed. Appx. 801, 802–03 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Quijada, 146 Fed.
Appx. 958, 960–62 (10th Cir. 2005).
166

4RETO -ARTINEZ, 421 F.3d at 1157. Treto-Martinez pled guilty in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado to unlawful reentry by a deported alien who had been removed
from the country subsequent to commission of an aggravated felony. )D The Sentencing Guidelines
advised a court to increase punishment by sixteen levels if a defendant remains in the country after
a felony conviction that is a crime of violence. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)
(1)(A) (1991). Treto-Martinez appealed the sentence imposed. 4RETO -ARTINEZ, 421 F.3d at 1157.
The court concluded the defendant’s prior conviction for aggravated battery constituted a crime of
violence. )D Causing physical contact with a deadly weapon in a rude, insulting or angry manner
was sufﬁcient to constitute actual use of force under the sentencing guidelines and would always
include as an element the threatened use of physical force. )D
167

4RETO -ARTINEZ, 421 F.3d at 1159; U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) provides that:
(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafﬁcking offense for which the
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a ﬁrearms
offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national security or terrorism
offense; (vi) a human trafﬁcking offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense,
increase by 16 levels . . . .

)D
168

4RETO -ARTINEZ, 421 F.3d at 1159.

169

)D at 1162.
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Despite interpreting “physical force” in other contexts, Hays was not a case
of ﬁrst impression for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
as it has spoken on domestic abuse issues dealing with the interpretation of
“physical force.”170 Therefore, (AYS interpretation of “physical force” undermines
the principles of stare decisis.171 The court’s interpretation of “physical force” in
the instant case offends the integrity of the judicial system because it did not treat
analogous situations alike in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis.172

Hays )MPOSES AN !MORPHOUS ,EGAL 3TANDARD
As indicated by Judge Ebel in the dissent, the court imposes an amorphous
standard to determine whether conduct involving physical force rises to the level
of a predicate offense.173 The Hays court’s addition of modifying language to
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is improper given the overall statutory scheme.174 Additionally,
implementing a standard requiring physical force result in either harm or injury
stiﬂes the promotion of judicial efﬁciency.175 In the dissent, Judge Ebel pointedly
asked what constitutes harm or injury in relation to an element of physical
force.176 Judge Ebel asserted that imposing a standard requiring the use of physical
force result in either harm or injury has the potential to ﬂood the courts with
litigation.177
170
Petitioner Brief-Appellee, supra note 19, at 10; SEE 4RETO -ARTINEZ, 421 F.3d at 1158–59;
-ILLER, 98 Fed. Appx. at 804; 1UIJADA, 146 Fed. Appx. at 964–70.
171

Jordan W. Connors, 4REATING ,IKE 3UBDECISIONS !LIKE 4HE 3COPE OF 3TARE $ECISIS AS !PPLIED TO
*UDICIAL -ETHODOLOGY, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 681, (2008).
The Supreme Court considers stare decisis—the obligation to adhere to past
opinions—to be “indispensable” to the “rule of law.” In describing the doctrine,
the Court has explained that “when an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only
the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which
we are bound.” This constraint helps legitimize the judicial system by requiring
the Court to treat like cases alike.
)D
172

Connors, supra note 171, at 681; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2008).
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law
as applying to a certain set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. The doctrine is the
means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically but
will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.

)D
173

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

174

'RIFlTH, 455 F.3d at 1343.

175

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting); Drew C. Ensign, 4HE )MPACT OF ,IBERTY ON 3TARE
$ECISIS 4HE 2EHNQUIST #OURT &ROM Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2006) (“Stare
decisis serves many important interests, including: (1) promoting judicial economy by avoiding
relitigation of issues.”).
176

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

177

)D.
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The Hays court’s imposition of its standard shows no regard for the rule laid
out by the United States Supreme Court in $UNCAN V 7ALKER.178 When construing
the meaning of a statute a court should, if possible, prevent any clause, sentence,
or word from being superﬂuous, void, or insigniﬁcant.179 As stated by the Courts
of Appeals in the First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, Congress clearly intended
to leave the language of § 922(g)(9) broad because it chose to place qualifying
language in the previous section.180 Furthermore, the legal standard adopted in
Hays frustrates the concept of judicial economy.181 Such a standard will inundate
the Tenth Circuit with questions relating to the quantitative aspects of both harm
and injury.182 This standard, like the standard adopted by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, serves as a qualitative measure.183 Therefore, by adopting this standard,
the panel of the Tenth Circuit provides no guidance to lower courts facing the
issue in the future.184

Hays 0ROVIDES .O #LARITY IN 2ELATION TO e A  ! II
Given the split of authority within the federal courts, the Hays court had the
opportunity to provide clarity as to whether Wyoming’s battery statute satisﬁes
the federal deﬁnition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.185 However,
unlike the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
the Tenth Circuit imposed a standard requiring physical force result in either
harm or injury to the victim.186 Prior to Hays, the only court to consider whether
the language of Wyoming’s assault and battery statute satisﬁes the physical force
requirement was the Ninth Circuit in "ELLESS187 Rather than ﬁnding the "ELLESS
court’s reasoning persuasive, the panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a different legal standard, rendering the Tenth Circuit a “lone ranger” in

178
$UNCAN, 533 U.S. at 175; see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the
impropriety of ﬁnding Congress’ omission of a word in one section, but not in another, intentional
and purposeful).
179

$UNCAN, 533 U.S. at 175.

180

Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

181

)D at 684–85 (Ebel, J., dissenting).

182

)D at 685 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (asserting the standard will necessitate the courts to hear
a substantial number of cases to deﬁne what types of injuries will merit an interpretation of the
application of physical force).
183

)D (Ebel, J., dissenting).

184

)D. (Ebel, J., dissenting).

185

See Hays, 526 F.3d at 684–85 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (discussing the various interpretations
of the federal courts on the issue).
186
)D at 677–78 (insisting force be violent in nature, the sort that is intended to cause bodily
injury, or a minimum likely to do so).
187

)D at 680; SEE GENERALLY "ELLESS, 338 F.3d 1063.
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relation to this question.188 At the time of the Hays decision, none of the federal
circuits to rule on the issue supported the imposition of language requiring the
use, or attempted use, of physical force to result in either harm or injury.189

)MPLICATIONS OF Hays
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Hays
serves as a considerable victory for individuals convicted under state assault and
battery statutes criminalizing de minimis touches.190 Given the circumstances
of how state court systems process misdemeanor cases, potential now exists for
widespread restoration of ﬁrearm rights, especially in states with all encompassing
assault and battery statutes.191 As in Hays, misdemeanor cases often pass through
the courts without the inclusion of facts in the charging document, plea agreement,
or plea colloquy.192 When combining these circumstances with the restraints of
the categorical approach, state assault and battery statutes like Wyoming’s are
rendered useless when serving as the predicate offense for federal prosecutions
under the Lautenberg Amendment.193 The Hays court’s holding provides
individuals convicted in the Tenth Circuit under broadly authored state assault
and battery statutes an avenue for restoring their right to possess ﬁrearms.194
Despite Congress’ intention to prohibit “wife beaters” and “child abusers” from
possessing ﬁrearms, Hays in effect restores ﬁrearm rights under the categorical
approach.195

188

See Hays, 526 F.3d at 684 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (asserting the standard adopted leaves the
Tenth Circuit standing alone in requiring “physical force” to result in either harm or injury).
189
)D. at 674; see supra notes 39–86 and accompanying text (asserting that a person cannot
make contact with the body of another without exerting some level of physical force, particularly
of an insulting or rude nature); see supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (asserting the term
“physical force” in relation to the deﬁnitional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) require
the violent use of force against the body of another).
190
Fun With Crimes of Violence, Kansas Federal Defender, http://kansasfederaldefender.
blogspot.com/2008/05/fun-with-crimes-of-violence.html, May 21, 2008 (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
191

)D

192

Stanley Z. Fisher, *UST THE &ACTS -AAM ,YING AND THE /MISSION OF %XCULPATORY %VIDENCE IN
0OLICE 2EPORTS, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993) (discussing the omission of factual information
which is important in criminal proceedings); Hays, 526 F.3d at 676.
Even the categorical approach, however, permits courts to look beyond the statute
of conviction under certain circumstances. When the underlying statute reaches a
broad range of conduct, some of which merits an enhancement and some of which
does not, courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial
records, such as the charging document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.
Hays, 526 F.3d at 676.
193
See Hays, 526 F.3d at 681. The categorical approach limits a sentencing court to examining
the statutory elements of the predicate offense. )D at 676.
194

)D at 681.

195

)D
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CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hays
blurs the law regarding whether the federal deﬁnition of a crime of domestic
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) criminalizes de minimis touches.196
The Tenth Circuit must reconsider the legal standard requiring “physical force”
to either result in harm or injury in order to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)
(ii).197 The disarray surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s deﬁnitional
requirement for an element of “physical force” must compel the United States
Supreme Court to hear a case on this precise issue and therefore provide clarity
and uniformity to the lower courts in the near future.198

196

See supra notes 39–86 and accompanying text.

197

See supra notes 39–197 and accompanying text.

198

See supra notes 126–97 and accompanying text.
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